In Ecuador, Noboa Develops an Iron First

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In Ecuador, Noboa Develops an Iron First

From Trotsky to Glas: Mexico and Its Long Tradition of Political Asylum

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In Ecuador, Noboa Develops an Iron First
477 words | 2 minutes reading time

Last Sunday, Ecuador held a referendum where 11 proposals were put up for the electorate’s approval. Nine of them were approved, all increasing the security services’ powers in light of what President Daniel Noboa has called the “internal armed conflict.” The two failed proposals were unrelated and dealt with financial matters and workers’ rights.  

Data. 2023 was the most violent year in the country’s modern history. Although intentional homicide figures have grown steadily since 2020, more than 8,000 murders were recorded last year. The uptick turned Ecuador into the most violent country in South America, with a rate of 44.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. 

  • The murder rate nearly doubled vis-à-vis 2022, when it stood at a still-high 25.9 per 100,000. 2022 also saw the rate nearly double with regard to 2021, when it stood at 13.7 per 100,000 inhabitants.

  • In the Americas, Ecuador’s murder rate is only surpassed by Jamaica, which regularly comes in as first in the world. If one believes official figures, Ecuador has a higher murder rate than crisis-addled Haiti.

  • Statistics can be somewhat misleading, however. Homicides have fallen sharply in most of the country, but Guayas Province, home to Guayaquil, the country’s financial capital, still pulls up the total numbers and accounts for around half of all murders.  

Between the Lines. In all, voters have voted to allow the military to engage in policing activities (73%); amend the Constitution to allow the extradition of Ecuadorian nationals (65%); permit the Army to establish gun control checkpoints (70%); increase penalties for terrorism and those who finance it (68%); and allow security forces to use confiscated weapons (65%).

  • The only two questions where the “no” option won were on business-friendly amendments to the Labor Code (70% against) and on whether to allow international arbitration for commercial disputes (65% against).

  • It should be noted that former president Guillermo Lasso proposed a similar referendum in February 2023, which was rejected by 52% of voters. The current security crisis has altered voters’ opinions.

  • On that occasion, Ecuador was already heading towards a violent reckoning, but citizens had not felt the most dramatic effects until January 2024, when the country was shaken by a far-reaching prison riot in which policemen were hanged by gangs and the headquarters of the public broadcaster were stormed.

The Balance. Noboa’s results have not been as immediate or far-reaching as in El Salvador, but he evidently enjoys the citizenry’s support. Nonetheless, his position is not as strong as would seem at first glance. In any case, Noboa’s job is remarkably difficult in light of the state’s troubled finances.

  • Last weekend’s referendum demonstrated broad, widespread support for the president’s fight against “terrorism,” which mostly refers to drug trafficking gangs linked to Mexican and Colombian cartels. 

  • Nonetheless, the plebiscite also showed that the electorate’s support is limited to Noboa’s “internal armed conflict.” His economic proposals, which were meant to reassure investors and add dynamism to the economy, both failed.

What We’re Watching

Guatemala has rejected the entry of more than 6,000 Venezuelans during 2024 [link]

Infobae

In the first quarter of 2024, the Guatemalan Migration Institute rejected the irregular entry of more than 7,900 foreigners, 77% (6,085) of them Venezuelan. Colombians, Ecuadorians, Peruvians, Salvadorans, Brazilians, and even Chinese citizens are also among those detained. The high number of South Americans coincides with Panamanian border data, which indicates that the number of immigrants this year is much higher than in 2023. By the end of last month, for example, 64,000 Venezuelan immigrants were recorded crossing the Darién jungle.

First Quantum preparing for post-election talks in Panama [link]

Ian Bickis, Financial Post

Toronto-headquartered First Quantum Minerals, the former operator of the now-closed Cobre Panamá mine is preparing to negotiate with the winner of the Panamanian presidential election, scheduled for May 5. The mine made up approximately 5% of Panama’s GDP and 75% of the country’s goods exports; it also made tax and royalty payments to the Panamanian state that totaled more than $567 million per annum. If an agreement is not reached, First Quantum will insist on international arbitration, where it demands $10 billion in compensation.

Argentine households struggle as markets cheer Javier Milei [link]

Ciara Nugent, Financial Times

Milei has managed to please international markets; Argentine bonds have doubled in value, and the informal dollar exchange rate has stabilized. Inflation has decreased, falling from 26% in December to 20% in January, 13% in February, and 11% in March. But the government’s austerity measures have led to the loss of some 50,000 public sector jobs, mostly in infrastructure projects, and workers’ real incomes have plummeted more than 19%. For Milei, these are painful, albeit necessary, measures; his big bet is that GDP, which is likely to contract 2.8% this year, will begin to grow before his approval rate, which sits around 50%, tanks.

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From Trotsky to Glas: Mexico and Its Long Tradition of Political Asylum
580 words | 3 minutes reading time

Ecuadorian police’s raid on the Mexican embassy in Quito has brought Mexico’s storied asylum tradition to light. Former Ecuadorian Vice President Jorge Glas, who was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment for corruption, is only the last example of an unlucky politician seeking refuge in Mexico, much to the chagrin of his home country.

  • For Mexico, Ecuador’s actions represent “a flagrant violation of international law and Mexican sovereignty.” Ecuador looks on the matter differently, arguing that Mexico was aiding a common criminal, not a political prisoner.

  • The Glas’ arrest inside the diplomatic mission violates both the Vienna Convention of 1969 and the Caracas Convention of 1954. This is immaterial, Quito claims, for such agreements lend themselves to abuse. 

  • The Ecuadorians, who doubtlessly remember when Rafael Correa’s left-wing government championed Julian Assange, realize that Mexico is the region’s asylum haven. They no longer see this as a noble pursuit; instead, it is deemed an obstacle to other nations’ sovereignty.

Archivist’s Corner. Mexico has sheltered philosophers, journalists, and politicians of all stripes and colors. Preferences have varied according to past Mexican governments’ leanings, but asylum is a Mexican state policy that has survived over time. The country has tended to favor left-leaning figures. 

  • From the end of the 19th century until today, Mexico has given asylum to figures such as the Cubans José Martí and Fidel Castro, as well as Ernesto “Che” Guevara. Spanish republican exiles were also prominently welcomed.

  • The list includes Russian Marxist ideologue Leon Trotsky, Peruvian political thinker Víctor Haya de la Torre, former Argentine president Héctor Cámpora, and even the deposed Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

  • More recently, Mexico has also been taken in the families of Salvador Allende and Pedro Castillo, former presidents Manuel Zelaya and Evo Morales, and Guatemalan indigenous activist Rigoberta Menchú.

How Does It Work? The Mexican Revolution is one of the country’s great founding myths, and its generous asylum policy can be understood under this framework. Mexican governments relish in conceiving of their country as a democratic nation open to the world. Thus, during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, a noted anti-clerical politician, the concept of an “open-door” Mexico was born.

  • Asylum has been fundamental to sustaining this narrative. Mexico claims it does not discriminate between ideologies, instead prioritizing a universalist conception of democracy.

  • This practice has served to “frame” Mexico’s history in a manner consistent with the Revolution, with facts being conveniently emphasized or forgotten. In Platonic terms, this amounts to a noble lie.

  • The open-door policy legitimizes the memory of the Revolution, distinguishing Mexico from the region’s other democracies—and even the United States. It is also used to increase cohesion at the domestic level.

Between the Lines. Throughout the 20th century, Mexico was deemed a “perfect dictatorship.” Mechanisms such as political asylum created the widespread idea of a democratic country open to the world, despite the fact that the PRI, the country’s formerly hegemonic party, practically maintained a single-party dictatorship

  • The tradition continues to this day. Power changed hands, but the way in which it is exercised has not varied. President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) and his party, MORENA, control almost all its levers and are only slightly constrained by the federal bureaucracy.

  • This version of history has canonized a Revolution that in practical terms, was nothing more than an abrupt attempt to reclaim the power that Porfirio Díaz, a modernizing dictator, had taken from the various regional strongmen.

  • Ecuador thus sees itself as the victim of Mexico’s policy, which Quito accuses of abusing diplomatic conventions and international treaties to maintain Mexico’s internal status quo.