Former U.S. Ambassador Unmasked As Cuban Spy

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In this issue, you will find:

•Former U.S. Ambassador Unmasked As Cuban Spy

•Venezuela’s Essequibo Saga Continues

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The GCaM Team

•Former U.S. Ambassador Unmasked As Cuban Spy
596 words | 3 minutes reading time

In a spectacle worthy of cinema, Víctor Manuel Rocha, former U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, was arrested in Miami on December 1. The one-time diplomat is accused of having been a Cuban spy since 1981, the same year in which he entered the State Department as a political-coned officer.

• Rocha had aroused suspicion after his retirement. From 2022 to 2023, he met with an FBI agent posing as a Cuban intelligence officer. In those meetings, Rocha, fond of calling Fidel Castro “the commander,” referred to the United States as “the enemy.”

• Rocha is accused of acting as a foreign agent without prior authorization. U.S. law allows its citizens, but not its officials, to lobby for foreign governments, but would never authorize a pro-Cuban lobbyist.

• The Department of Justice also claims that Rocha acquired his U.S. passport by false declaration, so in addition to any prison sentence, he faces denaturalization.

Profile. Rocha, 73, was born in Colombia, but moved to the United States at a young age. Armed with an exquisite resume, he is a graduate of the Taft School, a renowned boarding school in Connecticut, as well as Yale, Harvard and Georgetown. He became a U.S. citizen in 1978, three years before becoming a diplomat.

• Throughout his career, he was posted to Argentina, Honduras, Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Italy. According to retired CIA analyst Fulton Armstrong, Rocha was considered “brilliant,” but he never felt that he belonged to the American establishment.

• Before Washington reestablished relations with Cuba, Rocha was deputy principal officer of the U.S. interests section in Havana, at that time housed in the Swiss Embassy. This posting straightened his ties to the regime.

• His zenith came in 2000, when he was appointed ambassador to Bolivia. After retirement, Rocha was a member of the National Security Council and Council on Foreign Relations. He also earned significant sums as a consultant.

Archive. Rocha is hardly the first communist spy unmasked by the FBI; untold numbers of American officials collaborated with the Soviet and Cuban regimes at the height of the Cold War. The peculiar thing about Rocha’s case is that as a retired diplomat, he had been in circles of power for over 40 years.

• The closest example is that of Ana Belén Montes, a Puerto Rican of Asturian extraction. In 2001, Montes, a DIA agent, was sentenced to 25 years for being a Cuban spy. She was released last January.

• Montes never hid her ideological sympathies. As a student at Johns Hopkins, she was known for her leftist, and more specifically, pro-Sandinista beliefs. This did not hinder her career as a U.S. civil servant.

• Historically, Cuban spies in the United States have been true believers. They have not been motivated by money; ideological conviction and the satisfaction of having outwitted Washington, if only temporarily, have sufficed.

Why Does It Matter? At least within the context of the Cold War, Latin America has tended to interpret U.S. policy as unabashedly pro-right. U.S. diplomacy’s more complex doctrinal character, which has on occasion caused conflicts with conservative presidents, is ignored.

• The cases of communist spies are evidently few and far between, but it is nonetheless necessary to have a nuanced view of Washington’s actions in the region. Analysis remains anchored in Cold War-era anachronisms.

• The United States has certain inalienable priorities, such as its particular vision of democratic integrity. These have come to fore since the fall of the Soviet Union, as ideological competition has been eliminated.

• At the same time, it must be understood that the State Department is not the only government entity that makes foreign policy. A complex network of agencies, all with different characters and priorities, conditions U.S. behavior.

•Venezuela’s Essequibo Saga Continues
704 words | 3 minutes reading time

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro insists, as he has during the past few weeks, on the annexation of Essequibo. Everything suggests the regime is attempting to shore up nationalistic support in view of cratering support.

General View. After having won the referendum with a crushing majority (but a poor showing in terms of turnout), Maduro has issued countless threats, but not definitive movements, to further his annexation plans. 

• Indeed, two days after the referendum, Maduro presented a new official map of Venezuela with the state of “Guayana Esequiba.”

• He also announced that Major General Alexis Rodríguez Cabello—a congressman and cousin of prominent regime figure Diosdado Cabello—will be Venezuela’s provisional governor of Essequibo.

Regional Echoes. Guyana’s intense diplomatic activity has focused on presenting itself as a small country suffering a larger neighbor’s aggression. Predictably, all CARICOM member-states, the United Kingdom, India, France, Canada, and the United States have rallied to the Guyanese cause.

• Even Brazil, with whom Maduro maintains close relations, shares geostrategic interests with Guyana and has been deepening its military relations with Georgetown. 

• For Brazilian foreign minister Mauro Vieira, “Brazil’s role is to set the example that we always value and adopt a principle … of peaceful dispute resolution. Brazil had nine border problems … and all were resolved through peaceful negotiations and international arbitration. This is the best example.”

• “The issue is in the hands of the ICJ, which in recent days made a preliminary ruling. We hope that it can resolve this border issue between the two countries, both immediate neighbors of Brazil, with which we maintain excellent and important relations.”

Geopolitical Echoes. Brazil has responded in kind to Venezuela’s deployment of troops to the border. President Lula da Silva has said that “Mercosur cannot remain on the sidelines” and that Brazil will organize “as many rounds of talks as necessary, since we do not need more war.”

• Last week, the U.S. Southern Command flew over the Essequibo territory as a warning to Maduro, stating that Washington “will continue its commitment as Guyana’s trusted security partner and promote regional cooperation and interoperability.”

• The Essequibo dispute was first resolved through the 1899 Paris Arbitral Award, in which Venezuelan negotiators were not allowed to participate. For over a century, Caracas has denounced this as unjust. 

• Through the 1966 Geneva Agreement, Caracas and the withdrawing British agreed to further negotiations. These rounds never took place, and any court decision issued today is expected to favor Guyana.

Essentials. Just two days after the referendum was held, Maduro put forth a National Assembly bill calling for the defense of “Guayana Esequiba.” He also ordered the state oil company, PDVSA, to prepare plans for the exploration and extraction of resources in Essequibo. 

• The National Asssembly was ordered to draft a law to cancel offshore oil contracts awarded by Guyana—among them, to ExxonMobil—within the next three months.

Seen and Unseen. The Venezuelan military lacks the logistical resources, sheer personnel numbers, and weapons necessary to carry out operations of this magnitude. Its capacity to occupy Guyanese territory, particularly over long stretches of time, is doubtful.

• Venezuela faces the worst economic crisis in its recent history and the mere threat of war would further aggravate the crisis. Economic indicators seemed to improve in the wake of the lifting of some U.S. sanctions, but this would all be negated by the war.

• It is unlikely that the Venezuelan state could muster the resources to support the war and its accompanying economic consequences. Probable restrictions of foreign currency inflows, including remittances, would leave the government in dire straits.

Between the Lines. Most analysts deem a war unlikely, but one must not forget that Essequibo question attracts powerful emotions for Venezuelans; almost the entirety of the population, regardless of their support for the government, deem the territory rightfully Venezuelan.

• In exchange for the lifting of some U.S. sanctions, Maduro agreed to hold free and fair elections. Opposition candidate María Corina Machado’s popularity makes this unlikely, since Maduro is unwilling to give up power.

• Maduro’s strategy is somewhat reminiscent of right-wing Argentine dictator Leopoldo Galtieri’s decision to invade the Falklands, triggering a war that allowed Margaret Thatcher to retain power for nearly a decade.

• Yet the war drums are unlikely to sound: Maduro and Guyanese President Irfan Ali are meeting in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Tellingly, Ali arrived on a plane chartered by ExxonMobil.