The Group Behind Guatemala’s Protests

Dear all,

We welcome you to the thirteenth week of our Greater Caribbean Monitor (GCaM) pilot. We would like to remind you that as a token of our appreciation, we will be extending you an early-bird offer at the pilot’s conclusion.

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In this issue, you will find:

•Coverage of Guatemalan indigenous group 48 Cantones’ recent internal elections

•Reporting on Colombia’s recent $2.5 billion loan

•Analysis of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s amnesty agreement with Catalan separatists

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Best,

The GCaM Team

•Indigenism’s Conservative Vein
555 words | 2 minutes reading time

Last Saturday, 48 Cantons of Totonicapán, notable for leading Guatemala’s recent protests, held internal elections. Vicente Juan Tzoc was elected, but this was revoked after his close ties to Guatemalan police were made public. Tzoc was replaced by Tedy Zapeta, who will now lead the organization in 2024.

• Zapeta, the new president, is still a relatively unknown figure. He will take office on January 1, coinciding with the end of the government transition.
  

• There are no major ideological differences between the outgoing and incoming leaders. The 48 Cantons’ “Guatemalization” and turn towards countrywide prominence will likely continue, earning them an important place in national politics. 
  

• The current president, Luis Pacheco, said as much, emphasizing his organization’s defense of democracy. He points, however, to a recent change of strategy in the protests’ wake.

Panorama. The change in methods mentioned by Pacheco is due to demonstrations’ failure. The protests, blockades, and roadblocks fanned internal divisions and squandered the 48 Cantons’ funds. Indeed, levels of foreign financing were not as high as has been suggested. 

• The 48 Cantons have several factions. In Manichaean terms, one can speak of a conservative indigenism, chiefly concerned with internal affairs, and a political indigenism that seeks to influence the country at large. 
  

• The currently ascendant faction follows the policy set by former president Martín Toc, whose intention was always to turn the 48 Cantons into a political force at the national level. Despite its power, this is a minority faction. 
  

• Most are more interested in the traditional objectives of the organization, which are the protection of the forests of Totonicapán and, above all, the protection of the local water supply. 

Between the Lines. The 48 Cantons resent the political instrumentalization they have suffered. CODECA, widely perceived as a successor to Civil War-era armed groups, insists on depicting it as part of a united indigenous front, when the truth is that the 48 Cantons of Totonicapán have always embraced isolation.

• Historically, guerrillas never entered Totonicapán. Most members of the community are conservative and Catholic. They defend their communal ownership of forests and water resources, which they insist on managing without state involvement. 
  

• They aim to prove their claims with property deeds dating back to the reign of Charles V. After Guatemala’s 1871 Liberal Revolution, they were the only indigenous people to delimit their lands before the General Property Registry. 
  

• Their adherence to customary law is notable. Whatever its merits, Totonicapán has the country’s lowest crime rates. In this sense, it is similar to Yucatán in Mexico.  

The Balance. When the UN-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala still existed, it called for indigenous law to be granted constitutional recognition. The 48 Cantons vehemently rejected this proposal, since it would have limited their ability to deploy traditional, and grisly, methods and punishments.

• The 48 Cantons have an astonishing rallying power. For now, they have aided the Guatemalan left, but their undeniable capacity to paralyze the country and inflict great economic damage may end up being used against the incoming government.
  

• They are not merely a leftist entity. Unlike foreign-influenced indigenist groups, they have not shown the slightest interest in plurinationality or the legal “refoundation” of the country. 
  

• Once Guatemala’s current political crisis is surpassed, the 48 Cantons will likely return to their usual cause: an expectation of salutary neglect from the central government. In simple terms, they wish to be left alone.

•Petro Goes Into Debt for Social Justice
528 words | 2 minutes reading time

Last week, Colombia borrowed $2.5 billion after issuing two “social bonds,” both valued at $1.25 billion. The bonds have 12- and 30-year maturities. President Gustavo Petro (Colombia Humana, left) insists that the funds will be allocated to sustainable development initiatives.

• The 12-year bond has an 8% coupon, while the 30-year bond will pay its holders 8.75%. It should be noted that just three years ago, Colombia borrowed the same amount at 3.165%.
  

• Colombia’s debt offering was 5.1 times oversubscribed. Although only $2.5 billion worth of bonds were issued, investors offered $12.9 billion, evidencing some degree of market confidence in Colombia.
  

• The government is buoyant, boasting of its efforts “to seek financing alternatives with a green, social, and sustainable component.” It requires access to credit to finance its deficit, slated to hit 4.5% of GDP in 2024.

Yes, But. The country’s economic outlook is not unmistakably rosy. Last quarter, the profits of the state-owned energy company, Ecopetrol, fell by 46.5%, going from $2.375 billion to $1.28 billion in spite of small increases in the price of oil. Oil, one must recall, makes up 34% of Colombia’s legitimate exports.

• Ecopetrol’s poor performance is attributable to Petro’s platform, which does not hide its contempt for fossil fuels and extractive industries. The firm was particularly harmed by Petro’s punitive tax reforms.
  

• Colombia is not borrowing on advantageous conditions. The primary benefit of green bonds is their lower interest compared to ordinary public debt, but in truth, Colombia has agreed to relatively high interest rates.
  

• In July, for example, Guatemala borrowed $1 billion at a 6.6% interest rate, considerably lower than that achieved by the Colombians. The Central American country has markedly worse economic indicators.

Panorama. Petro’s big bet on renewables—despite leading an oil producer of some importance—is not the only example of his characteristic eccentricity. In terms of trade policy, he has sought to cultivate close ties with Asian countries, but his efforts have been somewhat hampered by his habitual unpunctuality.

• At the UN General Assembly, he was scheduled to meet with South Korean officials, whose advice on rural reform the Colombians were reportedly seeking. He was late and the Koreans withdrew.
  

• Petro has certain achievements, among them closer relations with Beijing. In October, several agreements were reached with China, the most important one facilitating the export of Colombian frozen meat.
  

• It is noteworthy that Colombia, unlike most of South America, remains very tied to the United States, which is its main trading partner and serves as the buyer for 34% of its exports.

Equilibrium. Petro’s unpopularity is manifest, as demonstrated by the results of the recent regional elections. The economy is bearing the brunt of his excessively ideological policies, which have shown a European-style environmental zeal despite the country’s reliance on oil.

• Petro cannot be compared to Chilean President Gabriel Boric, whose ideological profile is that of a North American leftist. The Colombian is in many ways an archetypal representative of the Latin American left.
  

• This notwithstanding, Colombia’s geopolitical importance is such that Washington will invariably seek to reach an understanding with those in power regardless of their ideology.
  

• In fact, the United States recently invited Colombia to its Asia-Pacific Forum. This may be interpreted as proof of Washington’s support for Colombia’s entry into APEC, the Singapore-headquartered trade forum.

•Spanish PM Sánchez Agrees to Everything
545 words | 2 minutes reading time

For more than a week, Spain and, above all, Madrid have been mired in protests. There is widespread revulsion at the confidence and supply agreement between Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez (PSOE, left) and Catalan separatist leader Carles Puigdemont (Junts, center). 

• Demonstrations against the agreement between the PSOE and Puigdemont, who lives in self-imposed exile in Belgium, have centered on Madrid’s Ferraz Street, home to PSOE headquarters. 
  

• Last Sunday, nearly a million citizens gathered in the country’s main streets and squares. Some protesters, especially those from Vox (right), criticized the establishment right’s perceived pusillanimity and advocated for a general strike.
  

• Before the last elections, which were held in July, the PSOE was avowedly anti-amnesty. However, Sánchez needs Junts’ MPs to be sworn in as prime minister. 

Between the Lines. The PSOE has tried to portray its agreement as a masterful exercise in statesmanship, but frankly, it has given in on practically all important matters. In order to remain in power, the party has renounced one of the few points of consensus among Spain’s “constitutional” (unionist) parties. 

• The agreement’s defining feature is a general amnesty for the separatist leaders behind the 2017 independence referendum. This culminated in the declaration of a Catalan Republic, hence the charges of sedition and rebellion against separatist leaders.
  

• The agreement recognizes Catalan leaders’ wish to retain 100% of the taxes collected by the region, forcing Madrid to subsidize Barcelona. In 2021, the region’s deficit amounted to €21.98 billion, or 9.6% of Catalan GDP. 
  

• Madrid will also partially forgive the autonomous communities’ debts. This ostensibly neutral policy delivers outsized benefits to Catalonia, Spain’s most indebted region; more than €15 billion will be forgiven under the jubilee.

Overview. Many of the amnesty’s opponents insist on its patently evident unconstitutionality, since the Constitution prohibits general pardons. These legal doubts are not expected to hinder the law’s enactment. 

• The Constitutional Court (TC), the only body with the power to suppress the law once approved, is dominated by the left. 
  

• It is rumored that the TC’s chief justice, Cándido Conde-Pumpido, is involved in drafting the law. Indeed, the magistrate was a prosecuter under former Prime Minister Zapatero, whose negotiations with ETA he lauded.
  

• There is also no organic opposition within the PSOE. Emiliano García-Page, president of Castilla-La Mancha and an important party “baron,” has manifested his displeasure, but has refused to encourage an internal revolt. 

The Balance. The left, which swore never to offer an amnesty, now does so to maintain power, putting its control of the different branches of government to good use. This may embolden the Latin American left, which often takes Spain as a model of political praxis (and vice versa).

• The European Union, which in theory serves as a guarantor of the legal order, has limited itself to “studying” the issue. It is extremely unlikely that Sánchez, with extensive contacts in Brussels, will be reprimanded. 
  

• The right’s sole remaining strategy is that of head-on collision in the streets. The PP, until recently the hegemonic center-right party, controls the Senate and could delay, but not prevent, the law. 
  

• There are, therefore, two options: either King Felipe VI refuses to sign the law, which is unlikely and would likely turn the PSOE into a republican force, or as Vox suggests, the right can call a general strike.