Guatemala: Arévalo Takes Office At Midnight

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In this issue, which is the last of the year, you will find:

•Arévalo Takes Office At Midnight

•Taiwan Drifts Further From Beijing

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•Arévalo Takes Office At Midnight
685 words | 3 minutes reading time

After weeks of uncertainty, January 14 came and went, with now-President Bernardo Arévalo (Semilla, center-left) having to wait until the first minutes of Monday the 15th for Samuel Pérez, his party colleague and ephemeral President of Congress, to invest him with the presidential regalia he had coveted and feared lost.

• The scene did not come easily. Guatemalan transfers of power usually take place “on the 14th at 14:00,” that is, at 2:00 pm. Yet the inauguration ceremony was endlessly delayed by the congressional session preceding it.

• In a break with tradition, outgoing President Giammattei did not attend. The task of draping Arévalo in the presidential sash fell to Pérez, who unexpectedly secured the presidency of Congress through backroom deals.

• Semilla was left with the satisfaction, and nothing more, of seeing Pérez and Arévalo together at the ceremony. Shortly thereafter, the Court of Constitutionality determined Pérez, formally an independent congressman, was ineligible to direct Congress.

Panorama. Expecting a fight for the presidency, Semilla’s deputies arrived ready for a trying day that would include unsavory deals. They were well-aware that Vamos (center-right) and its allies, all members of the outgoing ruling coalition, were insistent on placing one of their own, Sandra Jovel, at the helm of Congress. 

• Tensions broke when it was revealed that a “commission” would examine new deputies’ credentials to determine their eligibility. This was perceived as a delaying mechanism. The commission was led by Javier Hernández, a deputy notable for entering the chamber in a state of drunken stupor.

• The wait led to a clash when congressmen from Semilla, UNE (center-right), and VOS (center-left) burst into the room where the commission was working, pushing the doors open to shout about an ensuing “coup.”

Data. It should be noted that Semilla has been “suspended” by Guatemalan courts, meaning its name has been temporarily struck from the party registry and its members declared independents. The Vamos-led coalition passed a motion to make this apply to congressional appointments, rendering Semilla’s deputies ineligible for leadership positions.

• Despite this, Pérez’s ticket won and the motion was reversed. In another turn of events, Julio Héctor Estrada (Cabal, center) was sworn in; he had been left out due to a complaint filed just 48 hours before the session.

• As Pérez was sworn in as President of Congress, complaints were heard from the Vamos-led side, who deemed it an illegal move. They promised to appeal to the courts, which they promptly did the next day.

• In any case, Semilla, stereotyped as new and naïve, had demonstrated its ability play the game of Guatemalan politics. Despite holding only 23 of the 160 seats in Congress, it managed to seal a deal. It remains to be seen whether the partnership will last.

Highlights. The session lasted more than 13 hours. The delay in taking office and electing key congressional officials inflicted a climate of uncertainty upon the country, with some fearing Bernardo Arévalo would not be sworn in.

• Some recalled that four years ago, congressional drama also delayed Alejandro Giammattei’s inauguration for about four hours. The difference is that on that occasion, the delay was such that the Court of Constitutionality had to intervene.

• The King of Spain waited patiently throughout the evening, ultimately choosing to leave the theatre at which the ceremony was to be held. Samantha Powell, the leading U.S. representative, resorted to social media to advocate for Arévalo.

Seen and Unseen. Sergio Arana, until recently an influential figure in Giammattei’s party, now rubs shoulders with Samuel Pérez, as he showed during the session. Incidentally, his tie matched that of the President of Congress.

• Cándido Leal, who led the Ways and Means Committe in the last Congress, is also a Vamos member. This did not prevent him from joining 92 other deputies in voting for Pérez. 

• Sandra Jovel, who spearheaded Vamos and its allies, denounced that deputies voting for Pérez had been pressured into doing so by the United States, perhaps in the hope of seeing their U.S. visas restored.

• The truth is that Guatemala is a presidential country, and Arévalo now controls the state’s purse. Pérez will not be President of Congress for long, but it is clear that many are eager to serve as Semilla’s legislative backers.

•Taiwan Drifts Further From Beijing
521 words | 2 minutes reading time

Last Saturday, Lai Ching-te, of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, center), defeated Hou Yu-ih, of the Kuomintang (KMT, center-right), and Ko Wen-je, of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), in the Taiwanese presidential elections. The victor will take office on May 20.

• Taiwanese elections are decided in a single round. Lai won with 40.05% compared to Hou’s 33.49% and Ko’s 26.46%. Lai is currently vice president; his victory can be interpreted as a boon to continuity under the DPP.

• Lai’s 40.05% is far from the 57.13% achieved by outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen. The PPD failed to retain its legislative majority, losing 10 seats despite obtaining 2.18% more of the vote compared to 2020; the KMT gained an additional 14 seats.

• The DPP is a nationalist party opposing “reunification,” or indeed close ties, with China. From a diplomatic perspective, Lai’s victory complicates Taiwan’s relations with Beijing, which has branded the president-elect a “separatist.”

Essentials. As is known, in formal terms, both Taipei and Beijing claim the name “China” for themselves. This has a noteworthy historical basis: Taiwan was where the KMT government of Chiang Kai-shek took refuge after losing the civil war against the communists, who took Beijing in 1949.

• Until 1971, Taiwan held China’s seat at the United Nations, but in recent decades, it has been losing recognition. Beyond Guatemala, Belize, Paraguay and the Holy See, all its diplomatic support comes from small island-nations.

• That said, Taiwan has a wide network of informal relationships. Under the euphemism of “Chinese Taipei,” it competes in the Olympics and signs international agreements, including the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, a modest FTA with China.

• Despite not recognizing it as a state since 1979, the United States is a de facto ally. The Taiwan Relations Act governs Washington’s policy, allowing it to maintain “strategic ambiguity” over how it would respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Between the Lines. Taiwan and China still uphold the One China principle, according to which there are two claimant states, but a single Chinese nation. This is nothing more than a legal fiction that Taiwan cannot renounce, as it would expose itself to Chinese retaliation if Beijing’s dream of eventual unity is thunderingly dashed.

• Internal divisions plague Taiwan. The DPP, the ruling party, defends Taiwan’s independence; the KMT still clings to its Chinese identity. The TPP, a relatively new party, opts for a middle-ground, ambiguous position.

• All political forces in the country espouse a sort of local patriotism. However, parties such as the DPP seek to downplay the Chinese element, while the KMT insists that despite ideological differences, Taiwan remains essentially Chinese.

• Internal divisions are due not only to ideological differences, but also to cultural factors. Except for the small aboriginal population, the Taiwanese are ethnically Chinese, but the descendants of the 800,000 civil war refugees are more likely to identify strongly with their Chinese heritage.

The Balance. The status question, so to speak, is not the sole driving force in Taiwanese politics. The Taiwanese have other, more immediate concerns, such as the high cost of housing and stagnant wages; this, and not confrontation with China, is behind the DPP’s setback last weekend after 12 years in power. 

• Yet the consequences of the elections should not be ignored. The DPP seeks to disengage economically from China, its largest trading partner. Beijing, for its part, could dismantle existing trade agreements.

• In Central America, Taiwan will enjoy U.S. support when attempting to convince its remaining allies of its advantages over Beijing. It could also reactivate its informal relationships, which, while not providing diplomatic legitimacy, do bring commercial benefits—and de facto recognition of a sort.

• With decoupling and nearshoring, Taiwan is also looking to invest in the Americas. Semiconductor giants like TSMC have begun investing in the United States, but acknowledge that the experience has been plagued with delays and cost overruns. Latin America could enter its supplier network.